Abstract-In this paper, we propose a generic method to construct Hierarchical Identity-Based Signcryption scheme. Using this method, a Hierarchical Identity-Based Signcryption scheme can be converted from any Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption scheme. Then, we give a concrete instantiation, which is the first constant-size fully secure hierarchical identity-based signcryption scheme in the standard model. Furthermore, our scheme can achieve CCA2 security level without using any additional cryptography primitive.
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is a public-key encryption scheme where one's public key can be freely set to any value (such as one's identity): An authority that holds a master secret key can take any arbitrary identifier and extract a secret key corresponding to this identifier. Anyone can then encrypt messages using the identifier as a public encryption key, and only the holder of the corresponding secret key can decrypt these messages. This concept was introduced by Shamir [13] , a partial solution was proposed by Maurer and Yacobi [14] , and the first fully functional IBE systems were described by Boneh and Franklin [1] and Cocks [4] .
IBE system can greatly simplify the public-key infrastructure for encryption solutions, but they are still not as general as one would like. Many organizations have a hierarchical structure, perhaps with one central authority, several sub-authorities and sub-sub-authorities and many individual users, each belonging to a small part of the organization tree. We would like to have a solution where each authority can delegate keys to its subauthorities, who in turn can keep delegating keys further down the hierarchy to the users. An IBE system that allows delegation as above is called Hierarchical IdentityBased Encryption (HIBE). In HIBE, messages are encrypted for identity-vectors, representing nodes in the identity hierarchy. This concept was introduced by Horwitz and Lynn [9] , who also described a partial solution to it, and the first fully functional HIBE system was described by Gentry and Silverberg [10] .
In many situations we want to enjoy confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation of message simultaneously. The general IBE (HIBE) can not guarantee the authenticity and non-repudiation. A traditional method to solve this problem is to digitally sign a message then followed by an encryption (signature-then-encryption) that can have two problems: low efficiency and high cost of such summation, and the case that any arbitrary scheme cannot guarantee the security. Signcryption is a relatively cryptographic technique that is supposed to fulfill the functionalities of digital signature and encryption in a single logical step and can effectively decrease the computational costs and communication overheads in comparison with the traditional signaturethen-encryption schemes. The first signcryption scheme was introduced by Yuliang Zheng in 1997 [18] . Zheng also proposed an elliptic curve-based signcryption scheme that saves 58% of computational and 40% of communication costs when it is compared with the traditional elliptic curve-based signature-then-encryption schemes [19] . There are also many other signcryption schemes that are proposed throughout the years, each of them having its own problems and limitations, while they are offering different level of security services and computational costs.
By combining identity-based cryptology and signcryption, Malone-Lee [20] proposed the first identitybased signcryption (IBSC) scheme along with a security model. But Libert and Quisquater [21] pointed out that Malone-Lee's scheme is not semantically secure. Then, Chow et al. [22] proposed an identity-based signcryption scheme that can provide both public verifiability and forward security. In 2003, Boyen [23] proposed an anonymity identity-based signcryption scheme in the random oracle model. Then, Chen and Malone-Lee improved Boyen's scheme in efficient [24] . In 2009, Yu et al. [25] proposed the first identity-based signcryption scheme without random oracles. Similar to IBSC, Chow et al. [7] proposed the concept of hierarchical identitybased signcryption (HIBSC) by combining HIBS and HIBE. Then, Yuen and Wei proposed the first constantsize HIBSC without random oracles [17] , but they used an interactive intractability assumption and selective-id model in their reductionist security proof. It is an open problem to avoid these assumption and model.
Our contribution In this paper, we give a generic method to construct HIBSC scheme. Using this method, a HIBSC scheme can be converted from any HIBE scheme. Then, we give a concrete instantiation from the constantsize fully secure HIBE scheme introduced by Lewko et al. [11] . Our HIBSC scheme is the first constant-size fully secure hierarchical identity-based signcryption scheme in the standard model. Furthermore, our scheme can achieve CCA2 security level without using any additional cryptography primitive.
Organization In Section 2, we formally define the HIBE system and the HIBSC system, give the complete security definition, and give an introduction of composite order bilinear groups. In Section 3, we present our method for converting a HIBE scheme into HIBSC scheme, and prove the security of the HIBSC scheme in Section 4. In Section 5, we give a concrete instantiation which is fully secure with constant-size ciphertexts. In Section 6, we show how to enhance the security of our HIBSC, and give a modified HIBSC scheme which can achieve CCA2 security level without using additional cryptography primitive. In Section 7, we conclude and discuss open directions for further research.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption
A Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption scheme has five algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Delegate, Encrypt, and Decrypt.
( ) , PK MSK λ →
Setup
The setup algorithm takes a security parameter λ as input and output the public Notice that the decryption algorithm is only required to work when the identity vector for the ciphertext matches the secret key exactly. However, someone who has a secret key for a prefix of this identity vector can delegate to themselves the required secret key and also decrypt.
B. Hierarchical Identity Based Signcryption
A Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption scheme has five algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Delegate, Signcrypt, and Unsigncrypt.
The Setup, KeyGen and Delegate algorithms are same as those in the HIBE system. We describe the Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt algorithms as follow:
( , , , , )
The signcryption algorithm takes the public parameters PK , a message M , the identity and secret key of sender, the identity of receiver as input and outputs a ciphertext ( ,
The unsigncrypt algorithm takes the public parameters PK , a ciphertext , the identity of sender, the secret key of receiver as input and outputs
Otherwise, it outputs the symbol ⊥ .
C. Security Definition for HIBSC
The security definition of HIBSC includes two properties: indistinguishability and existential unforgeability. Then, we introduce a stronger property, strong existential unforgeability
1) Indistinguishability
We define the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen identity and adaptive chosen ciphertext/plaintext attack for HIBSC (IND-ID-CCA2/CPA), as in the following game: Setup. The challenger will run the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters PK to the adversary.
The challenger will also initialize a set S φ = , which will be the set of private keys it has created, but not given out. 
S Reveal
The attacker specifies an element of the set for a secret key SK . The challenger removes the item from the set S and gives the attacker the secret key. We note at this point there is no need for the challenger to allow more delegate queries on the key since the attacker can run them itself. 
S Signcrypt
2) Existential Unforgeability
We define the existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen identity and adaptive chosen plaintext attack for HIBSC (UF-ID-CPA), as in the following game: Setup. The challenger runs Setup algorithm. It gives the adversary the resulting public key PK and keeps the master secret key MSK to itself. Queries. The adversary makes repeated queries of one of four types: Create query, Delegate query, Reveal query, and Signcrypt query. All the queries are same as those in the indistinguishability game. 
3) Strong Existential Unforgeability
Strong existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen identity and adaptive chosen plaintext attack (SUF-ID-CPA) is defined using the following game: Setup, Queries and Forgery: Same as in the existential unforgeability game.
The adversary A wins if the following holds: 
D. Composite Order Bilinear Groups
Composite order bilinear groups were first introduced in [8] . We define them by using a group generator G , an algorithm which takes a security parameter λ as input and outputs a description of a bilinear group G . In our case, outputs where are distinct primes, G and are cyclic groups of order
and is map such that: 
III. CONVERT HIBE INTO HIBSC
As noted by Boneh [1, Section 6] and formalized in [5] , the key derivation of an identity-based encryption scheme immediately gives rise to a standard signature scheme. Similarly, Gentry and Silverberg [10] observed that any two-level hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme can be transformed into an IBS scheme. In this section, we gave a similar method for converting any Hierarchical 
SCT
The unsigncrypt algorithm takes the public parameters PK , a ciphertext , the identity of sender I S r , and the secret key of receiver as input, and computes 
IV. SECURITY OF OUR HIBSC
We prove the security of our HIBSC scheme from following two aspects:
A. Indistinguishability Theorem 1 Our HIBSC scheme is IND-sID/ID-CPA /CCA security, iff it is converted from a HIBE scheme, which is secure in the same security model, using our method. Proof. Without loss of generality, we just proof this theorem in the IND-ID-CCA2 model. Given any PPT adversary attacking our HIBSC in an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, we construct a PPT adversary attacking the HIBE in an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. Relating the success probabilities of these adversaries gives the desired result. We now define adversary as follows: B. Existential Unforgeability Theorem 2 Our HIBSC system is Existential Unforgeability security, iff it is converted from an INDsID-CPA secure HIBE, using our method.
We omit the proof of this theorem, because it can be proved using the method introduced in [1, 16, 12] .
V. CONCRETE INSTANTIATION
In this section, we gave a concrete instance of HIBSC. This scheme is transformed from an IND-ID-CPA secure HIBE [11] , using our generic method introduced in Section 3.
A. Our Construntion
:
The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group G of order . We let l denote the maximum depth of the HIBSC. The setup algorithm chooses
, and a hash 
. The new key is set as: 
, , )
C σ σ , the receiver decrypts the ciphertext as follows: Correctness: Proof. This HIBSC scheme is converted from an IND-ID-CPA secure HIBE scheme, using our method introduced in the Section 3. According to Theorem 2, the above HIBSC scheme is IND-ID-CPA and UF-ID-CPA security.
VI. FROM CPA TO CCA2
The above HIBSC scheme is IND-ID-CPA and UF-ID-CPA security. We can use the method introduced by Canetti et al. in [6] to modify this scheme to get IND-ID-CCA2 security, but the efficiency must be reduced. In fact, we only need make a small modification, exchanging the order of "sign" and "encrypt", and make a transformation from weak unforgeability into strong unforgeability using the method introduced by Boneh et al. in [3] . After the modification and transformation, we get a new HIBSC scheme, which is IND-ID-CCA2 and SUF-ID-CPA security.
A. Modified HIBSC scheme
Before introducing how to enhance the security, we give a modified hierarchical identity-based signcryption scheme mHIBSC, in which we only exchange the order of "sign" and "encrypt". The mHIBSC scheme also has five algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Delegate, Signcrypt, and Unsigncrypt. The Setup, KeyGen, Delegate algorithms are same as those in our HIBSC scheme introduced in the section 5. We describe the modified Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt algorithms as follow: ( )
The sender sends the tuple
SCT C C C σ σ = to the receiver.
C σ σ , the receiver verifies: It outputs the symbol ⊥ if the verification fails. Otherwise, it decrypts the ciphertext as follows: , and outputs M . Correctness: 
B. From Weak Unforgeability to Strong Unforgeability
The famous results of Canetti et al. [6] , further improved upon by Boneh and Katz [2] , show how to build a CCA2-secure Identity-Based encryption scheme from a 2-level HIBE scheme. We can use this method to build IND-ID-CCA2 secure HIBSC based our modified scheme. First of all, we will convert this scheme from UF-ID-CPA secure into SUF-ID-CPA, using the general transformation introduced by Boneh et al. [3] .
We 
The sender sends the tuple , and outputs M . Correctness: We omit the proof of this theorem, because it is easy to see that the security level of the modified scheme mHIBSC and the original scheme HIBSC are same. A successful forgery must output a forgery of Type I, Type II, or Type III. We show that a Type I forgery can be used to break the collision-resistance of H % , a Type II forgery can be used to solve discrete log in , and a Type III forgery can be used to break existential unforgeability of the underlying signcryption scheme mHIBSC. Our simulator can flip a coin at the beginning of the simulation to guess which type of forgery the adversary will produce and set up the simulation appropriately. In all three cases the simulation is perfect. We start by describing how to use a Type III forgery which is the more interesting case. Output. Finally, algorithm A outputs a forgery 0 1 ( , , C C ) ) 2 1 , , C σ σ 2 , ) y ) ) ) ) . Algorithm produces a weak forgery on the underlying scheme as follow. produces a Type III forgery, as required. A As space is limited, we omit showing how to use a Type I or Type II forgery. The method of making these forgery types can be found in [3] .
In summary, we showed how to use all three forgery types to break existential unforgeability of the underlying signcrypt scheme, collision-resistance of H % , or discrete log. This completes the proof of Lemma 1. Lemma 2 HIBSC new system is IND-ID-CCA2 security.
The results of Canetti et al. [6] , further improved upon by Boneh and Katz [2] , show how to build a CCA-secure identity-based encryption scheme from a 2-level HIBE scheme. This result is easily extended to n-level HIBE. An n-level IND-ID-CCA secure HIBE can be built form an n+1-level IND-sID-CPA HIBE and a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. Our mHIBSC system is IND-ID-CPA secure (Theorem 4), and our HIBSC new system is SUF-ID-CPA security (Lemma 1), so our HIBSC new system is IND-ID-CCA2 security.
Based Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can statement that our HIBSC new scheme is IND-ID-CCA2 and SUF-ID-CPA security.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a generic method to construct HIBSC scheme. Using our method, a HIBSC scheme can be easily converted form any HIBE scheme. But we note that, the efficiency of the HIBSC scheme relies on the delegation algorithm of the HIBE scheme seriously. So we should choose these HIBE schemes, which have efficient delegation algorithm as far as possible. Then, we proposed a concrete instantiation, which is the first constant-size fully secure hierarchical identity-based signcryption scheme in the standard model. Furthermore, our scheme can achieve CCA2 security level without using additional cryptography primitive, but it needs exchange the order of "sign" and "encrypt". Since this form is a little different from the usual signcryption schemes, it remains an open problem to construct a constant-size fully secure HIBSC scheme as usual form in the IND-ID-CCA2 security model without using additional cryptography primitive.
